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Rethinking Juvenile Rehabilitation: Presumptive Waiver
and Alternative Sentencing in Indiana
S. REESE SOBOL II*
Indiana’s juvenile justice system, like all systems of juvenile justice, is premised on
rehabilitation. And while Indiana is far from an outdated, overly punitive system,
there are several tangible opportunities for improvement. Indiana enacted an
alternative sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders waived into adult court in 2013,
but alternative sentencing has not been implemented in an effective manner yet.
Furthermore, Indiana’s statutory system of waiver contains several aspects that are
inconsistent with, or simply fail to account for, modern social science
understandings.
This Comment seeks to expound upon relevant social science principles within
the context of juvenile justice in order to bring to light many of the considerations
that form the basis of a developmentally focused system. The Comment will bring to
light twenty-first century literature on adolescent brain development and explain
how youth behavioral tendencies can be better understood in light of this research.
The Comment then takes an in-depth look at Indiana’s system of “presumptive
waiver” and its alternative sentencing scheme. Throughout this analysis, the
Comment will highlight serious problems and inconsistencies within these statutory
schemes.
The Comment will conclude with four concrete reform proposals that seek to
enhance Indiana’s system of waiver and alternative sentencing by making changes
informed by developmental social science principles. These reform proposals are not
unrealistic, system-rocking changes made for political grandstanding and internet
clickbait. They are real proposals that can be effectively and immediately
implemented without large-scale disruption. This Comment will demonstrate that
these proposals should be taken into serious consideration by the Indiana legislature.

* J.D., Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2021; B.A. in Financial Services,
Illinois Wesleyan University, 2017.
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INTRODUCTION
In Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court established the outer
boundary of juvenile justice in terms of treating juveniles as adults.1 The Court made
it unconstitutional for any state to impose a mandatory sentence of life in prison
without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for any individual under the age of eighteen
at the time of committing the offense.2 In 2016, the Court expanded this right by
giving it retroactive effect in Montgomery v. Louisiana.3 An important facet of these
decisions is that they only preclude mandatory LWOP sentences for youth
offenders.4 Miller still leaves judges with discretion to impose an LWOP sentence,
but requires that the sentencing official “have the opportunity to consider mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”5 This
discretion, the Court explained in Montgomery, respects the fact that many juvenile

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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criminal acts “reflect the transient immaturity of youth,”6 a concept that encompasses
much of the theoretical underpinnings of the juvenile justice system in America.
Again, Miller establishes only the outer boundary within which states must
conform their punishment of youth offenders. Consistent with our federalist system
of state administered criminal justice, states are free to provide juvenile offenders
with greater protections than those guaranteed by Miller. Such a system naturally
results in significant variance among states in their treatment of serious youth
offenders,7 both in the procedural posture in which they are charged (as juveniles or
as adults) and the sentencing schemes to which they are subjected.8
The focus of this Comment is the treatment of youth criminal offenders in the
State of Indiana, and specifically, the process of waiving youth offenders into adult
court and the corresponding sentencing schemes. The Comment addresses some of
the deficiencies in Indiana’s current system and makes concrete recommendations
for how it can be reformed. Before outlining the structure with which the Comment
will proceed, it is important to clarify what the Comment will and will not address.
Juvenile court jurisdiction in Indiana can be summarized as encompassing three
types of cases: (1) child abuse and neglect (CHINS cases); (2) delinquency cases;
and (3) termination of parental rights (TPR cases).9 The scope of this Comment is
limited to the Indiana legal system’s handling of adolescent criminal activity and thus
only touches on delinquency cases. Any legal, social, or other principles underlying
policy decisions in CHINS and TPS cases are beyond this Comment’s purview. Thus,
any reference herein to juvenile court or juvenile court jurisdiction refers exclusively
to delinquency cases.
Indiana Code Sections 31-37-1-1 and 31-37-1-2 set forth conditions under which
a juvenile court acquires jurisdiction over a delinquency case.10 These statutes
provide for jurisdiction in cases where it is alleged that a child has committed a
“delinquent act”—an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult.11 When a
juvenile court acquires jurisdiction over a case, it holds a fact-finding hearing (unless
the allegation is admitted) and determines whether the child has committed a
delinquent act.12 Any such finding must be based upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt.13 If the court determines the child did indeed commit the delinquent act, it will
hold a “‘dispositional’ hearing to consider alternatives for the care, treatment,
rehabilitation, or placement of the child.”14 Although the majority of youth criminal

6. 136 S. Ct. at 734.
7. Any reference to “serious youth offenders” throughout this Comment refers to
juveniles charged with the most severe crimes of violence—e.g., homicide, rape, aggravated
battery, or arson, etc.
8. See discussion of Indiana statutory presumptive waiver infra Part II.A.
9. Frank Sullivan, Jr., Selected Developments in Indiana Juvenile Justice Law (19932012), 48 IND. L. REV. 1541, 1542–43 (2015).
10. IND. CODE §§ 31-37-1-1 to -2 (2021).
11. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1543.
12. Id. at 1543–44.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1544.

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 379

1/24/22 9:06 AM

368

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:365

activity falls within this category of cases,15 they too are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
This Comment focuses on Indiana’s treatment of a much rarer and narrower group
of youths—youth homicide offenders and other serious youth offenders.16 Indiana
has a comprehensive statutory “waiver” system of transferring these juveniles into
the adult court system where they are tried and, if convicted, sentenced as an adult
would be.17 This system of waiver will be discussed at length in Part III of this
Comment.
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I outlines relevant social science
principles that should inform a developmental juvenile justice system focused on
rehabilitation. It addresses the ongoing brain development taking place during
adolescence and how this development affects youths’ ability to make decisions,
process risk and reward, and their capacity to make meaningful changes in their lives
as they reach adulthood. Part II analyzes Indiana’s statutory scheme of waiver and
alternative sentencing. It proceeds by analyzing the relevant statutes and discussing
specific cases where these provisions have been applied. Part III begins by dissecting
some of the deficiencies in the decisions mentioned in Part II in light of the principles
outlined in Part I. It goes on to argue for specific reform measures aimed at making
Indiana’s system of waiver and youth sentencing more flexible and responsive to
individual juvenile offenders.
I. ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CONTEXT
Since the turn of the century, developments in juvenile justice have stemmed from
the philosophical underlying presumption that “kids are different from adults, and
therefore to be fair in responding to their undesirable behaviors, the reaction must
differ from that for adults.”18 Christopher Sullivan19 has described what he has
termed the “intuitive argument” made by many scholars that appeals to this

15. A statistical report of all offenses referred to U.S. juvenile courts in 2017 found that
only 3800 cases, roughly one percent of all formally handled delinquency cases, were waived
to adult court. SARAH HOCKENBERRY, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, DELINQUENCY
CASES IN JUVENILE COURT, 2017, 3 (2019) https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh176/
files/media/document/253105.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4W8-ZEKU].
16. The same report found that 29.4% of offenses could be characterized as “person
offenses.” Furthermore, 63.4% of those offenses were simple assaults (and would not be
considered “serious youth offenders” for the purpose of this Comment). Aggravated assaults
and robberies accounted for 11% and 8.9%, respectively. Rape and homicide accounted for
only 3.5% and 0.5% of all person offenses, respectively. Id. at 1. Interestingly, person offenses
accounted for only 55% of the cases waived into adult court in 2017, with property offenses
accounting for 27%, and drug and public order cases each accounting for roughly 9%. Id. at
3.
17. IND. CODE § 31-30-3-1.
18. CHRISTOPHER J. SULLIVAN, TAKING JUVENILE JUSTICE SERIOUSLY: DEVELOPMENTAL
INSIGHTS AND SYSTEM CHALLENGES 71 (2019).
19. Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the School of Criminal
Justice at the University of Cincinnati. Dr. Christopher Sullivan, UNIV. OF CINCINNATI (2019),
https://staging10.uc.edu/about/centers/ucci/contact/faculty/christopher-sullivan.html
[https://perma.cc/K679-YL4N].
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reasoning.20 To paraphrase the logic behind the arguments he is referencing,
adolescents are inexperienced decision makers, and as such, it is expected that they
will make mistakes. Thus, they should be afforded more latitude and leniency for the
mistakes they make, and juvenile justice should focus on correcting, rather than
punishing.21 But it is necessary to develop a more fundamental understanding of what
makes children different and how it affects their behavior before any productive
conversation can be had about how to handle serious juvenile offenders. This Part
explores modern social science understandings about youth development within the
juvenile justice context in order to form a more developmental approach.
A. Youth Developmental Brain Processes
Recent studies of adolescent brain activity provide support for the “intuitive
arguments” mentioned in the preceding passage. These arguments were first
postulated from behavioral observations of youths. But through the use of magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) techniques, they are now supported by hard scientific data.
These studies demonstrate that biological immaturity in the adolescent brain
accounts for many of the issues young people have with decision-making, regulation
of emotions, and measurement of risk and reward, among other things.22 It is helpful
to address these different processes in turn.
It is common knowledge that youths have a lesser decision-making capacity than
their adult counterparts, but what accounts for that difference in capacity has been
misunderstood until the past two decades. Contrary to the traditional view that
changes in behavior during adolescence can be explained by immature cognitive
control capacities, more recent studies suggest that “what distinguishes adolescents
from children and adults is an imbalance among developing brain systems.”23 This
imbalance can be explained as involving two separately but concurrently operating
systems in the brain: one involved in cognitive and behavioral control and the other
dealing with socioemotional processes.24 As a result, adolescents lack the ability to
self-regulate because the brain system that influences pleasure-seeking and
emotional reactivity develops at a faster pace than the system responsible for selfcontrol.25 This goes a long way in explaining why certain youths make poor decisions

20. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 71. The reasoning of these intuitive arguments is reflected
in the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, which prohibited imposing the death
penalty on a juvenile offender under the Eighth Amendment. 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (stating
that “as any parent knows . . . ‘a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility
are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young.
These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions’” (quoting
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993)).
21. Id. at 70–71.
22. COMM. ON ASSESSING JUV. JUST. REFORM, NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, REFORMING
JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 96 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2013),
http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/Reforming_JuvJustice_NationalAcademy
Sciences.pdf [https://perma.cc/67AW-ZR8B] [hereinafter REFORMING].
23. Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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that land them in the juvenile justice system. When faced with a choice in an
emotionally charged environment, the chemical imbalance in the adolescent brain
causes many youths to choose the option with the greatest potential to satisfy these
pleasure-seeking brain regions.26 Adolescents are biologically wired toward risky
decision-making.27
This imbalance, as opposed to mere underdevelopment in decision-making
regions, is also important for another reason. It helps to explain how decision-making
might change for some juveniles as they grow older and their brain develops.
Research shows that adolescents have a fairly sophisticated cognitive level during
their mid-teenage years, meaning they are capable of understanding the level of risk
involved in a particular decision in the abstract.28 Put another way, adolescent risktaking is not influenced to a significant degree by the introduction of additional
information about the nature of the risk they are evaluating.29 The earlier maturation
of the limbic system—responsible for emotional arousal—as opposed to the
“elongated development of the prefrontal region”—which provides constraint over
these impulses—results in behavior favoring shorter term rewards (e.g., sex, drug or
alcohol use) over benefits which will not be realized until a much later time (e.g.,
financial security, good health, long-term personal autonomy).30 This explains why
adolescents’ threshold for risk-taking increases in emotionally charged situations
when there is heightened brain activity in their limbic systems.31 The corollary result
of this imbalance is that as youths mature into young adulthood, their cognitive brain
systems tend to catch up with their socioemotional counterparts, and their ability to
measure risk against reward and to inhibit impulsive behavior increases
accordingly.32
Perhaps no one is better situated to comment on the capacity of youth offenders
to reform their attitude and behavior than Bryan Stevenson, the founder and director
of the Equal Justice Initiative.33 Stevenson’s memoir, Just Mercy, provides many

26. Barry C. Feld, Competence and Culpability: Delinquents in Juvenile Courts, Youths
in Criminal Courts, 102 MINN. L. REV. 473, 555–56 (2017) (“Emotions influence youths’
judgment to a greater extent than adults and compromise adolescents’ decision-making and
self-control.”).
27. Id. at 556 (“Youths are more heavily influenced by the reward centers of the brain,
which contributes to riskier decisions.”).
28. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 78; see also Feld, supra note 26, at 555 (“By midadolescence, most youths reason similarly to adults, such as when, for example, they make
informed-consent medical decisions. But the ability to make reasonable decisions with
complete information under laboratory conditions differs from the ability to act responsibly
under stress with incomplete information.”).
29. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 76.
30. Id. at 77; see also Feld, supra note 26, at 557–58 (“The relationship between two brain
regions–the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the limbic system–underlie youths’ propensity for
risky behavior.”).
31. REFORMING, supra note 22, at 99.
32. See generally Feld, supra note 26, at 557–59. See also id. at 556 (“Although sixteenyear-olds’ understanding and reasoning approximates adults, their ability to exercise mature
judgment and control impulses takes several more years to emerge.”).
EQUAL
JUST.
INITIATIVE
(2021),
https://eji.org/about/
33. About
EJI,
[https://perma.cc/FKV8-8G8D].
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anecdotes about juvenile clients he has represented.34 After recounting the story of
Evan Miller, a fourteen-year-old sentenced to life in prison without parole, Stevenson
described conversations with Miller while he was incarcerated in which “he seemed
deeply confused” about “his own act of violence.”35 Stevenson then remarked:
“[m]ost of the juvenile lifer cases we handled involved clients who shared Evan’s
confusion about their adolescent behavior. Many had matured into adults who were
much more thoughtful and reflective; they were now capable of making responsible
and appropriate decisions.”36 He went on to explain the commonality he saw in the
cases involving a violent juvenile offender—most of his clients were “nothing like
the confused children who had committed a violent crime.”37 Stevenson describes
this attribute as “distinct” from his clients who committed crimes as adults.38
It is worth noting the substantial impact that peer exposure has on these neural
processes. Several studies have demonstrated the increased risk-taking tendencies of
youths in the presence of peers.39 These studies show heightened brain activity in
reward centers for adolescents in comparison with adults.40 Social situations
involving adolescents often “value short-term outcomes like status maintenance and
solidarity in behavior and attitudes.”41 Other factors regarding peer influence on
adolescent decision-making are discussed in the next section.
B. External Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making
It is no secret that external influences play a central role in adolescent decisionmaking. In fact, it has been suggested that adolescent decision-making and risktaking behavior is best understood through the interaction of the developmental brain
processes discussed above and environmental factors each individual youth is
subjected to.42 Modern research has identified three conditions as critically important
to fostering healthy psychological development in adolescence: (1) the presence of a
parent or a parent figure who is present and invested in the success and well-being
of the adolescent; (2) inclusion in a peer group that values and models prosocial
behavior and academic success; and (3) activities that contribute to autonomous
decision making and critical thinking.43 Analyzing each of these factors
demonstrates that they present challenges and opportunities for the juvenile system.

34. BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY (2014).
35. Id. at 265–66. Evan Miller was the plaintiff in the first case discussed in this
Comment, see supra note 1. Bryan Stevenson, through the Equal Justice Initiative, represented
him and successfully argued his case before the Supreme Court in 2012. Id. at 295–96.
36. Id. at 295–96.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 78–79.
40. Id.; Feld, supra note 26, at 555 (“As their orientation shifts toward peers, youths’
quest for acceptance and affiliation makes them more susceptible to influences than adults.
Peers increase youths’ propensity to take risks because their presence stimulates the brain’s
reward centers.”).
41. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 78–79.
42. REFORMING, supra note 22, at 100.
43. Id. at 101.
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The unfortunate truth is that there is no adequate substitute in the juvenile justice
system for the positive presence of parents in the home. Effective and supportive
parenting through nurturing, discipline, monitoring, and supervision can help prevent
negative behavior, develop prosocial behavior and values, and assist youths in
developing important competencies that enable them to protect themselves.44 A lack
of involvement or interest from parents, and/or high levels of family conflict in the
home, have pronounced negative effects on children that carry over into
adolescence.45 These effects include reduced emotional security, reinforcement of
aggressive tendencies and personal hostility, and increased involvement with deviant
peers (the effect of which will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs).46 While there
are opportunities for the juvenile justice system to intervene and be involved with
parents of delinquent youths early in the process,47 any discussion of these
opportunities is beyond the scope of this Comment because serious youth offenders,
generally speaking, are beyond the reach of their parents.48 However, where familial
influences have negatively impacted a youth’s development, which is often the case
with those that encounter the juvenile justice system, “[i]nvolvement with juvenile
court offers an opportunity to engage in developmentally formative action if family
is a risk factor for a youth.”49
The juvenile justice system can exert much more control over the effect of peer
relationships on youth behavior and development. While peer influences are
stereotypically thought of in negative terms of “peer pressure,” peer influences can
be, and generally are, positive.50 Positive peer influence takes place in many naturally
occurring groups through academic, athletic, and community-oriented settings.51 The
common thread running through these organizational activities is structure and adult
supervision.
There are, of course, many variables associated with peer association that
negatively influence youth behavior. When peer interaction takes place in
unstructured settings without adult supervision, incidences of offending increase
dramatically.52 The most obvious but also most salient form of negative peer
influence occurs through gang activity.53 As discussed in the previous section, the
presence of peers triggers heightened socioemotional activity in the brain, making it

44. COMM. ON SCI. ADOLESCENCE BD. ON CHILD., YOUTH, & FAMS., INST. MED. & NAT’L
RSCH. COUNCIL, THE SCIENCE OF ADOLESCENT RISK-TAKING 61 (2011) [hereinafter
Committee].
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 61–64.
48. I feel compelled to include a footnote emphasizing that once a serious youth offender
is incarcerated, continued parental contact through visitation, letters, telephone calls, etc.,
would likely provide a great boost to a delinquent’s morale and motivation to rejoin society.
But again, any such continued action on the part of parents is largely beyond the control of the
juvenile justice system.
49. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 166.
50. REFORMING, supra note 22, at 105.
51. Id. at 105–08.
52. Id. at 105.
53. Id.
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more difficult for youths to measure risk and control impulsive behavior. These
factors present the juvenile justice system with some of its principal opportunities—
providing adolescents with structure and supervision and mitigating the prevalence
of gang activity.54
Opponents of the notion that juvenile correction can positively reform youth
behavioral development will cite evidence that “aggregation of deviant adolescents
with other deviant adolescents” can negatively impact individuals in some
situations.55 Congregation of deviant youth can cause a phenomenon referred to as
“deviancy training,” a process by which delinquents in detention facilities learn new
inappropriate behavior and increase their chances of reoffending.56 Deviancy training
is most likely to occur when adolescents are grouped under the following
circumstances: (1) participants are of early adolescent age; (2) participants have
begun a trajectory toward deviance but are not extremely deviant; (3) participants are
exposed to slightly older, slightly more deviant peers; and (4) the setting is
unstructured and allows for free interaction without well-trained adult supervision.57
These factors make it apparent why the presence of the most depraved, serious
adolescent offenders in youth correctional facilities could have a substantial negative
impact on other, less serious offenders.
With this being said, all of the factors that make a situation conducive to deviancy
training demonstrate that any youth incarcerated in an adult correctional facility will
inevitably be influenced to a heightened degree by adult inmates. A juvenile—
regardless of age—is at an “early age” when compared to the other inmates at the
facility. The fact that the adolescent was waived into adult court and placed in an
adult correctional facility is dispositive in itself of his or her trajectory toward
extreme deviancy. The adolescent will be one of a small number of minors
incarcerated at the facility, meaning he or she will be exposed to inmates of all ages
and who have been convicted of crimes of any conceivable nature. Finally, regardless
of the level of security at the facility, the youth will be interacting daily with older
inmates of varying criminal propensity without any meaningful adult supervision. In
summary, the conditions in a juvenile facility that have been shown to promote
negative peer influence and increase prospects of reoffending are amplified to a
disturbing degree in an adult correctional facility. Thus, the effect of incarcerating
an adolescent in an adult facility is to give up on any chance of meaningful
rehabilitation through the justice system.

54. I use the term mitigate as opposed to eliminate in recognition of the fact that gang
activity can occur in juvenile correctional facilities. See, e.g., Atasi Satpathy, Note, Urgent
Reform “In the Name of Our Children”: Revamping the Role of Disproportionate Minority
Contact in Federal Juvenile Justice Legislation, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 411, 413 (2011)
(recounting the story of a young, black inmate at D.C. and Maryland correctional facilities
whose gang affiliation started while incarcerated and likely prevented him from obtaining a
sentence reduction).
55. REFORMING, supra note 22, at 106.
56. Mark Soler, Dana Shoenberg & Marc Schindler, Juvenile Justice: Lessons For A New
Era, 16 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 483, 523 (2009).
57. REFORMING, supra note 22, at 106.
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C. Juvenile Justice, Waiver, and the Effect on Future Youth Behavior
There are several ways a juvenile offender can end up in adult court, and
ultimately, an adult correctional facility.58 The major theoretical underpinning of the
juvenile justice system in America is rehabilitation of the offender.59 The decision to
waive a juvenile to the adult court system presupposes that rehabilitation through the
juvenile system is no longer an option.60 The following sections address this
presumption by analyzing the effects of the practice of waiving youths into adult
court on the development and future behavior of the youth offenders.
1. Problems Adolescents Face in Adult Criminal Court
Adolescents tried, convicted, and sentenced in adult criminal court go on to face
enumerable challenges at every stage of the process. Adolescent defendants have
been shown to think, behave, and understand legal proceedings differently than
adults during a criminal prosecution.61 They may be expected to:
(1) misinterpret the role of counsel and think that they must be truthful
with their attorney so the latter will decide whether to advocate for
the defendant’s interests; (2) distrust defense counsel and not be
forthcoming with that person due to a belief that adult defense attorneys
would not work for a juvenile the way they would for adults; (3)
overestimate the probability of desired events that may result in a greater
likelihood of rejecting plea bargains; and (4) have difficulty
comprehending the significance of the length of sentences, which can
interfere with an ability to appreciate the consequences of various
dispositions and to make informed legally-relevant decisions.62
As a result, developmental psychologists claim that adolescents lack the requisite
maturity of judgment to be competent to participate in a criminal trial.63
Unfortunately, the relative difficulty an adolescent faces in competently standing
trial in a criminal court is only the tip of the iceberg.
Research has shown that adolescents housed in adult correctional facilities are
far more likely to experience the worst outcomes of incarceration than those housed
in a juvenile center. While incarcerated youths are generally much more likely than
non-incarcerated youths to commit suicide,64 the statistics are even more alarming

58. See infra Part II.
59. Youth in the Justice System: An Overview, JUV. L. CTR. (2020), https://jlc.org/youthjustice-system-overview [https://perma.cc/YWN4-6SNS] (“Today’s juvenile justice system
still maintains rehabilitation as its primary goal and distinguishes itself from the criminal
justice system in important ways.”).
60. HOCKENBERRY, supra note 15, at 3.
61. Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Criminology: Juveniles’ Competency to Stand Trial: Wading
Through the Rhetoric and the Evidence, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135, 152 (2009).
62. Id. at 152.
63. Id. at 150.
64. Campaign for Youth Justice, Jailing Juveniles: The Dangers of Incarcerating Youth
in
Adult
Jails
in
America
10
(Nov.
2007),
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for those incarcerated in adult facilities. The CDC has estimated that youths in adult
jails are thirty-six times more likely to commit suicide than those in a juvenile
detention facility.65 Additionally, youths are substantially more likely to be raped or
sexually assaulted in adult prison. One survey reported five times as many youths
held in adult prisons having been subjected to an attempted sexual attack in
comparison to those held in a juvenile facility.66 Finally, non-sexual physical abuse
is much more pervasive at adult correctional facilities as well. Adolescents in adult
facilities are twice as likely to report being beaten at the hands of staff than those at
a juvenile facility and are fifty percent more likely to report being attacked with a
weapon.67
2. Merit to Notions of Deterrent Criminal Justice
The vast majority of research into recidivism rates of youths incarcerated at adult
correctional facilities has revealed that this practice has little to no deterrent effect.
A 2007 CDC report analyzed six separate studies of the deterrent effect of statutes
transferring youth to the adult criminal system.68 Of the six, only one indicated that
transfer of juveniles to the adult system had a deterrent effect on future violent or
general criminal activity, and another found no effect at all.69 The remaining four
studies all found that this subset of juveniles actually committed more subsequent
violent or general crime than youth retained in the juvenile system.70 Based on “the
Community Guide’s rules of evidence,” these studies provided a sufficient basis for
the CDC researchers to conclude that “transferring juveniles to the adult system is
counterproductive as a strategy for preventing or reducing violence.”71
Another report compiled by the Washington Coalition for the Just Treatment of
Youth analyzed the findings of the CDC report in the context of modern
understandings about youth brain development.72 This report elaborated on the

http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJJailing_Juveniles_Report_2007-11-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6KP-FGYQ] (citing DOJ
Bureau of Justice study finding the suicide rate for jail inmates under 18 was 101 per 100,000
from the year 2000 to 2002, compared with a rate of 5.32 per 100,000 amongst fourteen- to
seventeen-year-olds over the same time period).
65. Id.
66. Vincent Schiraldi & Jason Zeidenberg, The Risks Juveniles Face When They Are
Incarcerated With Adults, CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST. (July 1997),
http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/the_risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEQ2-SNN6].
67. Id.
68. Robert Hahn, et al., Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer
of Youth from the Juvenile to the Adult Justice System: A Report on Recommendations of the
Task Force on Community Preventive Services, Vol. 56/RR-9 6–7, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 30, 2007), https://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/PDF/rr/rr5609.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/GL9S-S8E3]
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. At 7–8.
72. WASH. COAL. FOR THE JUST TREATMENT OF YOUTH, A Reexamination of Youth
Involvement in the Adult Criminal Justice System in Washington: Implication of New Findings
about Juvenile Recidivism and Adolescent Brain Development (2009), https://www.njjn.org/
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adolescent brain research discussed in Section A above and concluded that
“adolescents are more amenable to rehabilitation than adults because one’s character
continues to form as the brain matures.”73 This logic explains why exposing
adolescents to “adult criminal culture rife with violence and antisocial behavior”
naturally results in many youth emerging from incarceration with a greater likelihood
of reoffending.74 In summary, during a period of brain development when the
juvenile justice system could be positively influencing and shaping an adolescent’s
future behavioral tendencies, many youths are thrust into an institution that will
likely set them on a path toward lifelong criminality.
II. TREATMENT OF JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN THE INDIANA JUSTICE SYSTEM
The remainder of this Comment addresses the effects and underlying policy
considerations behind the practice of trying juveniles as adults and, if convicted,
incarcerating them in adult correctional facilities in Indiana. Juveniles can end up in
adult court through several different mechanisms. The simplest way an adolescent
will end up in adult court is by way of jurisdictional age limits on juvenile courts.
Juvenile courts in all states have a jurisdictional upper age limitation of either fifteen,
sixteen, or seventeen.75 Any individual older than the upper limit who is charged with
an offense will be prosecuted in adult criminal court. A 2011 report from the Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the Department of Justice
(OJJDP) estimated that in the thirteen states that hold youths criminally responsible
before turning eighteen, roughly 175,000 cases involving sixteen- or seventeen-yearolds were tried in adult criminal court in 2007.76 Indiana is one of the majority of
states whose juvenile court jurisdiction has an upper age limit of seventeen.77
However, there are still a number of ways that youths in Indiana end up in adult
court.78
Indiana’s juvenile justice system employs a statutory scheme with some
progressive elements and a certain degree of flexibility for handling individual
juvenile defendants. While Indiana has generally tried to make its juvenile justice

uploads/digital-library/resource_970.pdf [https://perma.cc/57DE-7RSP].
73. Id. at 5.
74. Id. at 1.
75. SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, DELINQUENCY CASES WAIVED TO
CRIMINAL COURT, 2011 1 (2014), https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh176/
files/pubs/248410.pdf [https://perma.cc/475Z-JAAY].
76. PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T JUST., OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION,
TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 21
(2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf [https://perma.cc/29MM-2LUV].
77. Id.
78. For a thorough explanation of the three general types of statutory provisions that
enable youths to be tried in adult court irrespective of age, see generally Cynthia Soohoo, You
Have the Right to Remain a Child: The Right to Juvenile Treatment for Youth in Conflict with
the Law, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2017). Soohoo has labeled these three types
of statutes as “prosecutorial discretion,” “statutory exclusion,” and “judicial waiver” laws. Id.
There are examples of both statutory exclusion and judicial waiver laws in Indiana’s statutory
code. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-30-3-2 to -3 (LexisNexis 2020) (judicial discretion); id. §§
31-30-3-4 to -6 (presumptive waiver); id. § 31-30-1-4 (statutory exclusion).
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system more responsive to the special needs and characteristics of youth offenders,79
there are still several deficiencies in the system in its current form. Several attempts
at reform have been made over the last decade or so. But the focus (or aim) of these
reform measures has been inconsistent and, in some respects, in opposition to one
another.
The following two examples are illustrative of this dichotomy. Indiana has what
has been referred to as a “special ‘presumptive waiver’ situation for murder” that
automatically waives a child into adult court if they are charged with a crime that
would be murder if committed by an adult.80 Until 2015, this statute applied to any
child ten years or older.81 A 2015 amendment modified the statute slightly by raising
the minimum age requirement to “twelve (12) years of age,”82 displaying a measure
of compassion and understanding for the undeveloped and malleable phase of
childhood. However, in response to a 2018 school shooting in Noblesville, Indiana,
conducted by a thirteen-year-old boy,83 the Indiana legislature proposed a law that
would lower the age at which a child could be charged as an adult for attempted
murder from fourteen to twelve.84 This statutory proposal evinces either a lack of
understanding for the same attendant characteristics of adolescence or a disregard for
the role those characteristics should play in administering juvenile justice.
These two contrasting reform measures are indicative of larger problems with
Indiana’s treatment of serious youth offenders in the criminal justice system. This
Part engages with those problems by analyzing the statutory provisions this
Comment seeks to reform. This Part proceeds by explaining the way that these
statutes operate and providing examples of their application, highlighting problems
and inconsistencies along the way.
A. Presumptive Waiver Statute for Offenders Accused of Committing Murder
Indiana’s presumptive waiver statute for youths accused of committing murder
appears in Indiana Code Section 31-30-3-4.85 This statute combines prosecutorial

79. See generally Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1571 (explaining that “a ‘full investigation
and hearing’ is required before a judge makes a waiver decision, whether presumptive or
discretionary,” and emphasizing that a judge retains the final decision of whether or not to
waive a youth offender into adult court in each case).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. IND. CODE § 31-30-3-4(3), amended by Pub. L. No. 187-2015, § 26 (effective July 1,
2015).
83. Emma Kate Fittes, In Court, The Noblesville Shooter Was Quiet. In His Video, He
Calmly Pressed a Gun to His Cheek, INDYSTAR (Nov. 12, 2018, 8:19 AM),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/local/hamiltoncounty/education/2018/11/12/noblesville-west-middle-school-shooting-video-suspectchilling-court-quiet/1928846002/ [https://perma.cc/5DK6-3Y8D].
84. Chris Sikich, Noblesville School Shooting Inspires Legislation That Would Allow 12Year-Old Suspects in Adult Court, INDYSTAR (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.indystar.com/
story/news/politics/2019/01/15/noblesville-shooting-measure-would-allow-12-year-oldsuspects-to-be-tried-in-adult-court/2575505002/ [https://perma.cc/T2F9-256F].
85. IND. CODE § 31-30-3-4 provides:
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and judicial discretion. The statute can only be invoked on motion of the prosecuting
attorney. Once the prosecution makes the motion and after a full investigation and
hearing, the juvenile court “shall waive jurisdiction” if certain, relatively barebone,
criteria are met.86 The court must find that “the child is charged with an act that would
be murder if committed by an adult,” that “there is probable cause to believe the child
has committed the act,” and that “the child was at least twelve (12) years of age when
the act was allegedly committed.”87 The final provision of the statute leaves a small
amount of discretion with the judge, stating that the juvenile court may retain
jurisdiction if “it would be in the best interests of the child and of the safety and
welfare of the community for the child to remain within the juvenile justice
system.”88
The three enumerated criteria that the juvenile court must find to waive
jurisdiction under this statute do not call for much factfinding. The first condition,
that the child is charged with an act that would be murder if committed by an adult,
is easily satisfied by the prosecutor’s charging decision. The second condition, the
existence of probable cause to believe the child committed the act, is the same
precondition that must be met to hold a defendant on criminal charges for any crime
in adult court in Indiana.89 Probable cause is not regarded as a particularly high
standard to meet.90 The final condition, the age of the defendant, is also easily proven
and is unlikely ever to be in dispute. Thus, it is safe to assume that a prosecutor will
almost always be able to satisfy the requisite conditions to waive a youth accused of

Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after full investigation and
hearing, the juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction if it finds that:
(1) the child is charged with an act that would be murder if committed
by an adult;
(2) there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed the
act; and
(3) the child was at least twelve (12) years of age when the act
charged was allegedly committed;
unless it would be in the best interests of the child and of the safety and welfare
of the community for the child to remain within the juvenile justice system.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Overview
of
Indiana
Criminal
Procedure
for
the
Non-Lawyer
Information/Indictment, THE CLARK CNTY. PROSECUTING ATT’Y: VICTIM/WITNESS SERVS.,
http:www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/victim/VICTIM2.HTM [https://perma.cc/M9S2-LFES]
(explaining that, to initiate a prosecution in Indiana, a prosecutor files an Information with the
court along with a Probable Cause Affidavit, from which the “Judge must find that there is
‘probable cause’ to believe that the defendant committed the crimes charged”).
90. See Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951,
996 (2003) (debating the correct percentage of certainty to meet the probable cause standard
and concluding “probable cause is thus a percentage nestled somewhere between .01% and
51%”); Lynda E. Frost & Adrienne E. Volenik, The Ethical Perils of Representing the Juvenile
Defendant Who May Be Incompetent, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 327, 347 (2004) (explaining
that in the absence of an established standard for competence of a juvenile to stand trial as an
adult, “it is probably appropriate to think in terms of a fairly low standard, like probable
cause”).
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murder into adult court, leaving the decision in most cases to the discretion of the
judge.
The final provision of the statute offers judges discretion to keep a case in juvenile
court. Under the statute, the juvenile court “shall waive jurisdiction if it finds that”
the necessary conditions are met “unless it would be in the best interests of the child
and of the safety and welfare of the community for the child to remain within the
juvenile justice system.”91 This Comment takes the position that the discussion in
Part II of this Comment92 provides dispositive evidence that it is always in the best
interests of the child to remain in the juvenile justice system.93 However, research on
Indiana case law did not uncover any cases where a court seriously debated whether
waiver was in the best interests of the child. Discussion of this provision of the statute
has always considered both the interests of the child and the interests of society in
tandem, as though those two interests are inseparable for the purpose of making these
decisions. As a result, Indiana juvenile courts have denied a motion by a prosecutor
under section 31-30-3-4 and retained jurisdiction over a very small and narrow subset
of cases.
State v. J.T. is a 2019 case in which the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld a decision
by a juvenile court to deny a prosecutor’s motion to waive jurisdiction under section
31-30-3-4.94 The court gave some credence to the prosecutor’s argument by noting
that the twelve-year-old juvenile had committed a “brutal act with some degree of
premeditation.”95 However, the court then proceeded to discuss the girl’s “symptoms
of severe mental illness:” a dissociative identity disorder that manifested itself
through multiple personalities named Star and Anna, as well as experiencing
hallucinations, blackouts, and voices in her head.96 The court also discussed the
conditions the youth was brought up under, including a broken and unstable home
life; pervasive verbal, physical, and potential sexual abuse; constant exposure to
controlled substances and alcohol; and continuous bullying at school.97 The court’s
exposé of evidence of J.T.’s mental illness and her disturbing upbringing spanned
thirty-five paragraphs of the opinion.98 After acknowledging that “[n]either the
juvenile court nor this Court can predict the future,” and that J.T’s treatment under
the supervision of the juvenile court “may not adequately address [her] mental
illness,” the court concluded that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the prosecution’s motion to waive jurisdiction.99

91. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-4 (LexisNexis 2020).
92. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
93. See discussion supra Section II.C.
94. 121 N.E.3d 605, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
95. Id. at 614.
96. Id. at 614–16.
97. Id.; id. at 614 (“J.T. was repeatedly physically and verbally abused by her half-brother,
who punched and choked her.”).
98. Id. at 614–20; see id. at 618 (“J.T’s answers to one diagnostic questionnaire indicated
that she had experienced severe physical abuse, emotional neglect, emotional abuse, severe
sexual abuse, and physical neglect (meaning that her basic physical needs had not be met in
the past).”).
99. Id. at 620–21.
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J.T. v. State is illustrative of the extremely high bar that must be shown in order
to overcome the “presumption in favor of waiver” that exists when the conditions of
section 31-30-3-4 are met.100 This is the only case citing this statute on Lexis or
Westlaw in which a prosecutor’s motion to waive jurisdiction was denied by a
juvenile court. It may be true that juvenile courts in Indiana decline motions by
prosecutors to waive jurisdiction under section 31-30-3-4 more often than is reflected
in retrievable appellate decisions. But the paucity of relevant case law leaves juvenile
courts without any meaningful guidance to determine when the presumption is
overcome, beyond the vague language contained in the statute.
Villalon v. State further illustrates how rare and difficult it is to overcome the
presumption of waiver where a juvenile is alleged to have committed murder.101 In
this case, fifteen-year-old Martin Villalon allegedly chased down and shot another
boy of similar age because Villalon believed him to be a member of the Vice Lord
gang.102 Upon the state’s motion and after a hearing, the juvenile court waived
jurisdiction into adult criminal court.103 Villalon was convicted of murder and
sentenced to sixty years imprisonment.104 On appeal, Villalon focused his argument
on what was in the best interests of himself and the safety and welfare of the
community, emphasizing his lack of criminal history and his minor juvenile
record.105 The court rejected these arguments, instead finding that it was not in
Villalon’s best interests to remain in the juvenile system because he did not have the
“identified psychological or mental health issues that would benefit from treatment
in the juvenile system.”106 And further, it was not in the interests of the safety and
welfare of the community because, despite his “very limited juvenile history,”
Villalon reported involvement with gang activity where he was pressured to sell
marijuana, and that he had tried alcohol and marijuana at an early age.107 Finally, the
court relied on a forensic evaluation conducted by a doctor that recommended that
Villalon be “waived to adult court ‘due to the heinous nature of the offense.’”108
There are several troubling aspects of this decision. First, the court seems to find
the fact that Villalon lacked any serious psychological issues or mental illness to be
dispositive evidence that he would not benefit from treatment in the juvenile system.
This runs contrary to the extensive body of evidence that shows that the decisionmaking capacity of adolescents continues to progress into their midtwenties.109
Furthermore, the court finds that Villalon’s gang affiliation and his willingness to
sell drugs at the encouragement of his fellow gang members are factors that would
make him a continuing threat to society and his community if he is retained in the
juvenile system. However, social science research suggests that his gang affiliation

100. Id. at 613 (citing Moore v. State, 723 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“Proof
of these elements creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of waiver.”)).
101. 956 N.E.2d 697, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
102. Id. at 702.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 705. Villalon’s juvenile record was limited to truancy and property damage. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See generally supra discussion in Section II.A.
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is a factor that substantially exacerbates his inability to control his impulses and make
future-oriented decisions.110 Villalon’s gang affiliation should properly be viewed as
an explanatory factor for why he committed this act in the first place, rather than
evidence that he will be a continuing threat to society in the future or that he is
incapable of rehabilitation.
As for the court’s recitation of the fact that Villalon drank alcohol and tried
marijuana at a young age, it is unclear why his substance use factors into the court’s
analysis of his threat level to society. The court’s discussion of these facts reflects an
antiquated, general disdain toward the use of alcohol and marijuana by minors. To
be clear, this Comment does not suggest that it is acceptable for adolescents to use
marijuana or drink alcohol, but it is well established that experimenting with these
substances during adolescence is incredibly common.111 Therefore, a court should
not rely on self-reported drug or alcohol use by a juvenile as evidence that they are a
continuing threat to society.112
Finally, the court’s description of this crime as “heinous” is a mischaracterization
and illustrates why there should not be a presumption in favor of waiver. Yes,
Villalon did shoot and kill another person in what can only be construed as an act of
gang violence, but he did not torture or humiliate him.113 The act was not preceded
or motivated by an act of sexual violence, nor were there any other specific facts the
court cited to justify its characterization of the killing as “heinous.”114 So why did
the juvenile court call this a “heinous” crime, and why does that justify the court’s
decision to waive jurisdiction? One answer to this question is that taking the life of

110. See supra discussion in Section II.B.
111. See Teen Substance Use & Risks, CDC (February 10, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fasd/features/teen-substance-use.html [https://perma.cc/FG45FAQ2] (stating that by 12th grade, about two-thirds of students have tried alcohol, and half of
9th through 12th grade students reported ever having used marijuana); see also Robert Woods
Johnson Foundation, Model Policies for Juvenile Justice and Substance Abuse Treatment: A
FUTURES
(July
2008)
Report
by
Reclaiming
Futures,
RECLAIMING
https://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/resource_860.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XE2X9R6X] (stating that “as many as four in five teens in trouble with the law are abusing drugs
and alcohol” and citing a membership survey by the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges that determined sixty to ninety percent of teens in juvenile court have a substance
abuse problem).
112. It could also be argued that preventing juvenile offenders from using alcohol and
drugs is one of the most attainable benefits of juvenile incarceration. For that reason, if drug
or alcohol abuse played a significant role for a juvenile in committing or prompting the
decision to commit a crime, this should factor in favor of keeping that individual in the juvenile
system.
113. Compare Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014) (finding that, “although
senseless and reprehensible, the murders in this case were not particularly heinous” because
“there is no evidence that the victims were tortured, beaten, or lingered in pain”), and Taylor
v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 341–42 (Ind. 2006) (concluding that a trial court erred in
characterizing a murder a “heinous” where the defendant killed the victim with a single
gunshot wound to the heart over an unpaid debt), with Penick v. State, 659 N.E.2d 484, 488
(Ind. 1995) (finding it heinous that the defendant caused a drawn-out, painful, and torturous
death for the victim).
114. See Villalon v. State, 956 N.E.2d 697, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
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another human being is, by and large, the worst thing that an individual can do to
another person. For that reason, every murder can be described as a “heinous”
crime.115 And if a child committing a heinous crime is enough by itself to find that it
is not in the best interests of the safety and welfare of the community to retain that
child in juvenile court, then there is never a situation in which a child accused of
murder should not be waived into adult court.116 But this statute retains a provision
providing for judicial discretion to deny waiver into adult court in certain situations,
which means that the Indiana legislature intended for there to be instances where a
child takes the life of another person and remains in the juvenile system. If the
legislature intended for this discretionary provision to only apply in situations where
extreme mental illness predated the criminal act, it would make sense that they would
have made that intention explicit, as opposed to the open-ended provision the statute
employs in its current form. But this is essentially the reading that has been given to
the statute by Indiana appellate courts, which is the natural result of instituting a
presumption in favor of waiver.
B. Alternative Sentencing Scheme
Indiana has a statutory alternative sentencing scheme available for juvenile
offenders after conviction in an adult court.117 This scheme provides judges with
discretion to keep certain offenders within the juvenile system for a period of time
before serving the remainder of their criminal sentence at an adult corrections
facility. It also grants judges the option to modify an offender’s criminal sentence
based on progress and rehabilitation demonstrated by the offender while under the
supervision of the juvenile system. The mechanics and potential benefits of the
alternative sentencing scheme are discussed in more detail in Section (a) below. The
issues with the implementation of Indiana’s alternative sentencing scheme are
covered in Section (b).
1. Overview of Alternative Sentencing
An offender is eligible for sentencing under this scheme if he or she: is less than
eighteen; is either (1) waived into an adult court under Indiana Code section 31-303 or (2) is charged with a felony over which a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction under
section 31-30-1-4; and is convicted of committing the felony or enters a plea of
guilty.118 If an individual qualifies for alternative sentencing and “there is space

115. It is important to note that this oversimplified explanation ignores the fact that the
Indiana Supreme Court has previously defined when a crime can accurately be characterized
as heinous. See Villalon v. State, 956 N.E.2d 697, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); see also Holmes
v. State, 642 N.E.2d 970, 972–73 (Ind. 1994); Reaves v. State, 586 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ind.
1992).
116. The only exception would be with the profoundly disturbing circumstances present in
a case like J.T. v. State that would balance the analysis back in favor of retaining the child in
the juvenile system because of severe and pervasive mental health issues that the court deems
treatable in a residential facility. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
117. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-30-4-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2020).
118. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-4-2(a) (LexisNexis 2020).
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available for the offender in a juvenile facility of the division of youth services of the
department,” the sentencing court may: (1) impose an appropriate criminal sentence;
(2) suspend the criminal sentence; (3) order the offender to be placed in a juvenile
facility of the division of youth services; and (4) “provide that the successful
completion of the placement of the offender in the juvenile facility is a condition of
the suspended criminal sentence.”119
In summary, this statute allows for a juvenile waived into adult court and
convicted of a felony to be placed in a juvenile facility for a period of time before
being incarcerated in an adult correctional facility. This has several benefits. First,
the adolescent has a much lower probability of committing suicide or being
physically or sexually assaulted in a juvenile facility.120 Additionally, because the
youth has the opportunity to spend a significant number of his or her remaining
formative years of development outside of the adult correctional system, the youth
has a greater chance at rehabilitation and may be less susceptible to the trend of
recidivism associated with youths waived out of the juvenile system.121 These can be
characterized as the “front-end” benefits of Indiana’s alternative sentencing scheme.
Indiana’s alternative sentencing statutes also provide “back-end” flexibility by
allowing courts to modify a sentence in response to significant rehabilitation
demonstrated by an individual offender. Under Indiana Code section 31-30-4-5,122
upon request of the sentencing court, the department of correction must provide a
progress report concerning an offender sentenced and placed in a juvenile facility
under the alternative sentencing program.123 Additionally, the department of
corrections is required to notify the sentencing court when one of these offenders
turns eighteen, and the sentencing court must hold a review hearing concerning the
offender’s progress before he or she turns nineteen.124 After said hearing, the
sentencing court has the discretion to:
(1) continue the offender's placement in a juvenile facility until the
objectives of the sentence imposed on the offender have been met, if the
sentencing court finds that the objectives of the sentence imposed on the
offender have not been met;
(2) discharge the offender if the sentencing court finds that the objectives
of the sentence imposed on the offender have been met;
(3) order execution of all or part of the offender's suspended criminal
sentence in an adult facility of the department of correction; or
(4) place the offender:
(A) in home detention under IC 35-38-2.5;

119. Id. § 31-30-4-2(b)(1)–(4).
120. See supra discussion Section I.C.1.
121. See supra discussion Section II.C.2; see also Olivia Covington, Juvenile
Incarceration, Crime Falling Nationwide, THE IND. LAW. (July 9, 2019),
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/50780-juvenile-incarceration-crime-fallingnationwide [https://perma.cc/P6HL-9ZQS] (“Most literature now accepts the proposition that
human brains are not fully developed until the mid-20s, so detaining minors can have a
negative impact on their minds, especially for young people who have mental illnesses.”).
122. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-4-5 (LexisNexis 2020).
123. Id. § 31-30-4-5(a).
124. Id. § 31-30-4-5(a)(1)–(2).
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(B) in a community corrections program under IC 35-38-2.6;
(C) on probation under IC 35-50-7; or
(D) in any other appropriate alternative sentencing program.125
The only limitation on the court’s discretion under this statute is that upon motion of
the prosecuting attorney, it may not modify the sentence of an offender over whom
a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction under Indiana Code section 31-30-1-4.126
It is important to summarize what this “Progress Report” provision entails. First,
it requires the detention facility to closely monitor the progress and rehabilitation of
an individual offender sentenced under section 31-30-4-2 and to provide the
sentencing court with a written update on the offender at any time the court requests
one. In addition, it requires the sentencing court to hold a review hearing between
the youth’s eighteenth and nineteenth birthday, during which the court will review
the youth’s progress. Depending on the court’s evaluation of the youth, it has the
power to modify the original criminal sentence, discharge the offender from the
system entirely, or order execution of the original sentence in full. The court can also
order the juvenile to be transferred to a number of other alternative sentencing
programs outside of a juvenile detention facility. The statute’s most important feature
is the wide-ranging flexibility it affords judges to take into account the progress, or
lack thereof, of individual offenders and to make decisions accordingly. This
flexibility and individualized decision making is entirely consistent with what social
science researchers have advocated for in crafting responses to delinquent juvenile
behavior.127
Indiana’s alternative sentencing scheme clearly has the potential to benefit many
juvenile offenders, but these benefits cannot be realized without proper
implementation and application of the statute. The next Section addresses some of
the underlying problems with the statute in its current form.
2. Problems with Current Application
Indiana’s alternative sentencing scheme is a good starting point for progressive
juvenile justice, but there are substantial problems with the statute as written and
with the manner in which it has been interpreted and applied that hinder its
effectiveness. The statute lacks any explicit factors to guide courts in determining
when it should be applied, and the approach courts in Indiana have adopted
essentially renders the statute null and void in most circumstances. Additionally,

125. Id. § 31-30-4-5(b).
126. This statute takes jurisdiction away from the juvenile court for any offender at least
sixteen years of age charged with committing (1) attempted murder, (2) murder, (3)
kidnapping, (4) rape, (5) criminal deviate conduct (before its repeal), (6) robbery (if committed
with a deadly weapon, or if robbery results in bodily injury), (7) carjacking (before its repeal),
(8) carrying a handgun without a license (if charged as a felony), or (10) any offense that may
be joined under IC § 35-34-1-9(a)(2) with any crime listed in this subsection. IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-30-1-4(a) (LexisNexis 2020).
127. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 167 (“Maintaining some individual decision-making
discretion—within boundaries—is important in ensuring that discretion that takes account of
developmental factors can enter the assessment process and subsequent decision making.”).
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there are components of the “Progress Report” provision that could be modified so
that judicial decisions made under this provision occur at the optimal point in a
juvenile offender’s development without compromising the safety of other inmates
and staff members in juvenile detention facilities. Finally, the last provision of the
statute contains a measure of inflexibility that takes discretion away from judges in
a manner counterintuitive to the flexible and discretionary nature of the preceding
provisions of the statute. Each of these issues will be explored in the following
Sections.
a. The Alternative Sentencing Statute Lacks Explicit Factors to Guide Courts
The alternative sentencing statute is highly discretionary, providing that a “court
may . . . impose a sentence upon the conviction of the offender under this chapter” if
certain conditions are met.128 However, the statute is silent as to why a court would
or would not impose an alternative sentence. It does not list any factors to consider
or elements to be met. The statute—passed in 2013—is still relatively new, and as a
result, there are few cases interpreting it.129 However, the cases that have interpreted
and applied the statute are consistent in how they determine whether alternative
sentencing is appropriate.
Legg v. State is instructive on this point.130 Sixteen-year-old Donta Legg was
convicted of murder and sentenced to fifty-five years in prison.131 Legg argued on
appeal that the trial court erred in declining to sentence him under the alternative
sentencing scheme.132 Before analyzing Legg’s argument, the Indiana Court of
Appeals acknowledged that “[t]he statute itself offers no guidance regarding when
the alternative sentencing scheme should be implemented.”133 The court then cited
the factors listed in Indiana Code section 31-30-3-2134 and found them “to be
instructive,” and further, that they are “good examples of the kinds of criteria a trial
court may consider in reaching its decision on this issue.”135 This might not seem

128. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-4-2(a) (LexisNexis 2020) (emphasis added).
129. Act of Apr. 29, 2013, Pub. L. No. 104-2013, § 1 (codified as amended at Ind. Code §
31-30-4 (2014)). A February 21, 2021, search performed on both LexisNexis and WestLaw
for cases citing this statute yielded only four results on both databases, with no variation
between the two.
130. 22 N.E.3d 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
131. Id. at 764.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 766.
134. Under this statute, the court must consider whether the act charged is a felony that is
either heinous or a part of a repetitive pattern of delinquent acts, the child was at least fourteen
at the time of offense, there is probable cause to believe the child committed the act, the child
is beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile justice system, and it is in the best interests of the
safety and welfare of the community for the child to stand trial as an adult. IND. CODE ANN. §
31-30-3-2(1)–(5) (LexisNexis 2020).
135. Legg, N.E.3d at 767; see also Honorable v. State, 2019 WL 1561977 *4 (Ind. Ct. App.
Apr. 11, 2019) (“[W]hile there are no mandatory considerations for a trial court making this
determination, the criteria listed in Indiana Code section 31-30-3-2 regarding waiver into adult
court ‘are good examples of the kinds of criteria a trial court may consider in reaching its
decision on this issue.’” (citing Legg, N.E.3d at 767)).
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problematic at first blush. In fact, it would seem quite helpful to have wellestablished, previously interpreted statutory factors to use in making the
determination whether or not to impose alternative sentencing.136 But this ignores
what section 31-30-3-2 is—a discretionary waiver statute allowing a juvenile court
to waive jurisdiction over an offender when the enumerated factors are met.
The result of the court’s decision to use these factors to determine if alternative
sentencing is appropriate is a circular analysis that inevitably does not work in favor
of the individuals meant to benefit from this sentencing scheme. Consider the
process: a juvenile court has a case involving a serious youth offender; the court
looks to the factors set out in section 31-30-3-2 to determine if waiver into adult court
is proper and decides in the affirmative; the youth is tried and convicted in adult
court; the adult court, in considering whether to impose alternative sentencing, again
looks to the factors set out in section 31-30-3-2. At this point in the process, the only
thing that has changed from the initial waiver determination is that what was alleged
to have happened in the juvenile court was proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have
happened in adult court—making it virtually impossible for a judge to find that these
factors weigh in favor of granting the offender an alternative sentence. Is it plausible
to believe that the Indiana Legislature intended for this result? Would they have
implemented an alternative sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders with the goal
in mind that no juvenile waived into adult court would ever successfully be able to
invoke it? This interpretation essentially renders the statute ineffective and
superfluous.
b. The Mandatory Hearing and Evaluation of Youth’s Progress Takes Place at an
Unnecessarily Early Point in Time
The “Progress Report” statute can be amended such that the mandatory hearing
and evaluation takes place at a later point in time without causing undue safety risk
to others. In the statute’s current form, the hearing and evaluation must occur
between the juvenile’s eighteenth and nineteenth birthday.137 However, the youth is
eligible to remain in a juvenile facility until he or she is twenty-one.138 Additionally,
there are statutory safeguards that allow for continued monitoring of the juvenile by
the sentencing court and provide for the offender’s removal if he or she becomes a
danger to other inmates or staff.139 Thus, there is minimal safety risk in delaying the
point at which the sentencing court examines the youth’s progress and reevaluates
the efficacy of the original sentence.
Furthermore, because it is well established that adolescents continue to mature
and develop their decision-making processes well into their midtwenties,140 it makes

136. Indiana Code Section 31-30-3-2 has been cited twenty-one times on Lexis and fortynine times on WestLaw.
137. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-4-5(a) (LexisNexis 2020).
138. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-4-6(a) (LexisNexis 2020) (“At any time before an
offender placed in a juvenile facility under section 2(b) of this chapter becomes twenty-one
(21) years of age, the department of correction may transfer that offender to an adult facility
if the department of correction believes the offender is a safety or security risk.”).
139. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-4-3–6 (LexisNexis 2020).
140. See Covington, supra note 121 (“Most literature now accepts the proposition that
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sense to give offenders as much time as possible to demonstrate their rehabilitation.
It is true that this two-year delay could make no difference for an individual offender,
but it is also possible that an offender progresses by leaps and bounds toward
rehabilitation during this time—so much so that it makes a meaningful difference
when the court reevaluates his or her sentence. Additionally, there are controls in
place for the removal of an offender who demonstrates that he or she is incapable of
rehabilitation, too dangerous to retain in a juvenile facility,141 or violates a condition
of his or her suspended sentence in some other way.142 Therefore, any potential harm
in delaying the progress hearing is outweighed by the possibility for rehabilitation.
And because the legislature has already contemplated circumstances that necessitate
removal of an offender from a juvenile facility, in the absence of these circumstances,
the sentencing court’s evaluation of the juvenile’s progress should take place at the
latest possible point in time.
c. The Sentencing Court Should Retain Discretion at all Times in Making Final
Decisions under this Statute
The Indiana Legislature established an alternative sentencing scheme that
provides judges with a vast amount of discretion at almost every step of the process,
except for one category of offenders. The final provision of the “Progress Report”
statute provides that, for any “offender over whom a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction
under IC 31-30-1-4 . . . [t]he court may not modify the original sentence of an
offender to whom this subsection applies if the prosecuting attorney objects in
writing to the modification.”143 Recall that Indiana Code section 31-30-1-4 takes
jurisdiction away from juvenile courts for offenders charged with certain felonies.144
It is unclear why judicial discretion is taken away for only this narrow subset of
offenders based on the unilateral decision of a prosecutor. There is no reason why
the statute cannot specify that a motion of a prosecuting attorney creates a
presumption against modifying a sentence for these offenders—or something of that
nature—while leaving the ultimate decision to the judge. Because this abdication of
judicial discretion is inconsistent with the rest of the alternative sentencing scheme
established by the Indiana Legislature, it should be abolished or amended.
III. INDIANA SHOULD ADOPT A SYSTEM OF WAIVER WITH A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR
OF ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING
The preceding Sections have established that the Indiana statutory system of
waiver and alternative sentencing, while containing some positive progressive

human brains are not fully developed until the mid-20s, so detaining minors can have a
negative impact on their minds, especially for young people who have mental illnesses.”).
141. See Legg v. State, 22 N.E.3d 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
142. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-4-3 (LexisNexis 2020) (providing that the sentencing court
may order execution of the previously suspended criminal sentence, with or without
modification, if it finds by a preponderance of evidence that the offender has violated a
condition of the suspended sentence or committed a new offense).
143. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-4-5(c) (LexisNexis 2020).
144. See supra discussion Section I.C.1.
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elements, has some significant deficiencies that detract from the overall juvenile
justice goal of rehabilitation. This Section makes concrete proposals to amend the
applicable statutes in order to rectify some of these problems. I acknowledge that
these proposals will not altogether eliminate the problems identified in this Comment
and could potentially lead to other ancillary issues. However, my position is that
these proposals will move Indiana’s juvenile justice system toward the proper
balance between flexibility and individualized decision-making that accounts for
modern social science principles and provides serious youth offenders with an
opportunity for rehabilitation.
A. Abolish Presumptive Waiver
Indiana should abolish or amend all statutory provisions that impose presumptive
waiver. The discussion in Section III.A focused exclusively on Indiana Code section
31-30-3-4, dealing with youths accused of murder, but sections 31-30-3-5145 and 3130-3-6146 also carry a presumption in favor of waiver. The analysis of Indiana cases
dealing with challenges to presumptive waiver provisions demonstrate that absent
excruciating underlying mental health issues, Indiana courts will not find that it is in
the best interests of a child or the safety and welfare of the community for a youth
offender to remain in the juvenile system.147 Courts appear to have taken the position
that a serious youth offender without a severe mental disorder is categorically
incapable of rehabilitation through the juvenile system. This logic contradicts social
science findings about adolescent brain development that have shown significant
behavioral adjustments taking place as late as an individual’s midtwenties.148
Furthermore, Indiana courts fail to take relevant social science principles into
account when they weigh the facts of a particular offense that counsel for or against
waiver. Factors such as gang affiliation and susceptibility to peer pressure are looked
at as probative evidence that an offender will be a continuing threat to society. But
social science understandings explain that the negative peer pressure, particularly in
a gang setting, exacerbates the already deficient short-term decision-making
capabilities of adolescents.149 Often of paramount concern in a gang setting, pressure
to impress peers increases brain activity in pleasure-seeking regions of the adolescent
brain, which then overpower the less active regulatory brain regions.150 As

145. Indiana Code section 31-30-3-5 applies to offenders at least sixteen years of age
charged with a Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, or Level 4 felony, and involuntary manslaughter or
reckless homicide as a Level 5 felony.
146. Indiana Code section 31-30-3-6 applies to minors who are charged with a felony
offense and who have previously been convicted of a felony or nontraffic misdemeanor.
147. See generally supra Section III.A.
148. See Feld, supra note 26, at 557 (“Neuroscience research reports that the human brain
continues to mature until the early to mid-twenties.”).
149. Id. at 560–61 (“As their orientation shifts toward peers, youths’ quest for acceptance
and affiliation makes them more susceptible to influences than adults. Peers increase youths’
propensity to take risks because their presence stimulates the brain’s reward centers.”).
150. Michael N. Tennison & Amanda C. Pustilnik, “And if Your Friends Jumped off a
Bridge, Would You Do it too?”: How Developmental Neuroscience Can Inform Legal Regimes
Governing Adolescents, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 533, 583 (2015) (“Gangs are peer
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adolescents grow into adults, this imbalance equalizes, and their susceptibility to
impulsive decision-making due to the presence of peers diminishes accordingly. For
these reasons, the prospect of separating a youth from his or her affiliated gang—or
other negative peer group—should be seen as a positive opportunity for the juvenile
system as opposed to evidence that the youth is a continuing danger to society.
Presumptive waiver should be abolished. If the goal of a juvenile justice system
is to rehabilitate, then the presumption should be to keep juveniles within that system
as often as possible. Indiana’s presumptive waiver system fails to adequately take
into account individual characteristics of defendants and their offenses, and it should
be repealed accordingly.
B. Amend Indiana Code Section 31-30-4-2(a) to Impose a Presumption in Favor of
Alternative Sentencing
Indiana should amend Indiana Code section 31-30-4-2(a) such that there is a
presumption in favor of alternative sentencing for every youth offender that falls
within the statute. Juvenile offenders are more amenable to rehabilitation than
Indiana courts account for in assessing requests for alternative sentencing.
Furthermore, the Indiana Legislature’s failure to provide explicit factors to guide
courts in determining when to impose alternative sentencing has led to a backwards
system in which it is virtually impossible for youths to benefit from this alternative
scheme. Courts now look to the same factors that a juvenile court weighs in making
the initial waiver determination. These factors will not paint a youth offender in a
better or more sympathetic light after he or she has been adjudged or pled guilty, and
thus, courts will continue to decline to impose alternative sentences.
Ultimately, it is within the purview of the Indiana Legislature to settle on explicit
factors that should guide this analysis, but the social science principles discussed in
this Comment provide several good starting points. The level of premeditation as
opposed to impulsive conduct should be instructive. Adolescents lack sufficient
emotional regulation and tend to favor short-term rewards even if negative
consequences are imminent. Youth offenders who act on impulse should be treated
more leniently than those who commit a pre-planned crime with the benefit of time
to consider their actions. Additionally, the presence of peers, particularly an older
peer, should be seen as a factor weighing in favor of alternative sentencing. Youth
offenders often act irrationally to impress others, and this tendency diminishes as
they get older. Finally, lack of a criminal history should be given heightened
importance when determining whether alternative sentencing is appropriate. An
isolated, serious offense can understandably result in a youth offender being tried in
adult court, but if the offender has a minimal criminal history, they should be given
the opportunity to show rehabilitation through alternative sentencing.

pressure mechanisms. They play into all of the age-typical adolescent neurological
vulnerabilities: Temporal discounting or the ‘short future’; impulsivity; poor risk/reward
calculations that overvalue positive . . . payoffs; discounting negative outcomes . . . ; the need
for peer approval; and the use of the social group for identity formation.”).
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These are merely starting points and should be expanded upon by the Indiana
Legislature through a statutory amendment that also includes an explicit presumption
in favor of alternative sentencing. For the juvenile system to accomplish its goal of
rehabilitation, youths must be given every opportunity to show they are rehabilitated.
C. Amend Indiana Code Section 31-30-4-5 to Mandate that the Sentencing Court
Conduct its Review Hearing between the Offender’s Twentieth and
Twenty-First Birthday
Indiana should amend Indiana Code section 31-30-4-5 so that the review hearing
performed by the sentencing court takes place between the twentieth and twenty-first
birthday, as opposed to between the eighteenth and nineteenth. This Comment has
emphasized ad nauseam the fact that youth development continues into the
midtwenties. It also has been established that Indiana’s alternative sentencing
scheme has extensive safeguards in place to ensure that offenders who pose a danger
to other inmates or staff are promptly removed from juvenile facilities.151 Any youths
that do not pose a risk of danger should be given every opportunity to demonstrate
their rehabilitation. Other states, such as Michigan152 and Ohio,153 have already
imposed a system of reevaluating serious youth offenders at or near the age of
twenty-one. Indiana should follow suit.
D. Abolish the Restriction in Subsection 31-30-4-5(c) Prohibiting the Court from
Modifying the Sentence of an Offender Convicted under that Subsection on
the Motion of a Prosecutor
One of the most encouraging aspects of Indiana’s alternative sentencing scheme
is the flexibility afforded to judges in making decisions throughout the process. The
sentencing court is uniquely situated to communicate with the juvenile offender’s
supervisors and monitor the progress of the offender. Contrarily, the prosecuting
attorney has no responsibility or capability to conduct ongoing monitoring of the
youth’s progress. Relinquishing judicial discretion over this category of offenders
causes the statute to lose one of its primary benefits. It places total control in the
hands of an adversary party who is ill-equipped to make an informed decision
regarding the progress and rehabilitation of the youth offender. This provision should
be abolished or amended so that the prosecutor’s motion is not determinative of a
final decision to modify an offender’s sentence if they fall within subsection (c).

151. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
152. See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1572–73 (discussing “blended” sentencing in
Michigan).
153. See Andrea Knox, Note, Blakely and Blended Sentencing: A Constitutional Challenge
to Sentencing Child “Criminals,” 75 Ohio St. L.J. 1261, 1292 (2009) (describing Ohio’s
serious youthful offender provision as a complex blended sentencing scheme); see, e.g., In re
J.B., No. CA2004-09-226. 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 6348, *52–3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2005)
(finding no error in trial court’s decision to impose concurrent adult and juvenile sentences
under the serious youthful offender provision, with the juvenile sentence to be carried out until
age twenty-one).
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CONCLUSION
Crafting a perfect system of administering juvenile justice is an impossible task,
but constantly working on improving and modernizing a system to get as close as
possible is something every state should strive for. Indiana’s juvenile justice system
has made many important strides over the last couple of decades, with one of its
principal accomplishments being the enactment of its alternative sentencing scheme.
Unfortunately, alternative sentencing has not been implemented on a wide scale, and
this is likely due to a lack of sufficient legislative guidance for when and how to
effectively utilize this sentencing mechanism. Indiana also took a step in the right
direction by amending its presumptive waiver statute for youths accused of murder
to raise the minimum applicable age from ten- to twelve-years-old. But regardless of
age or offense classifications, presumptive waiver statutes present a serious
roadblock against the kind of flexible decision-making necessary for effective
juvenile justice administration. More can and should be done to bring the Indiana’s
juvenile system in line with modern social science research and understandings.
In order to bring further positive reform to Indiana’s juvenile system, this
Comment makes four concrete proposals: (1) abolish “presumptive waiver” in
Indiana Code sections 31-30-3-4 to -6; (2) amend Indiana Code section 31-30-4-2(a)
to impose a presumption in favor of alternative sentencing for all juvenile offenders
waived into adult court; (3) amend Indiana Code section 31-30-4-5 to mandate that
the sentencing court conduct its review hearing between the offender’s twentieth and
twenty-first birthday; and (4) abolish the restriction in subsection 31-30-4-5(c)
prohibiting the court from modifying the sentence of an offender convicted under
that subsection on the motion of a prosecutor.
Each of these four proposals are small individual steps in their own right, but
together they present a significant opportunity for Indiana to be a leader in the area
of developmental juvenile justice. Effective utilization of Indiana’s alternative
sentencing scheme will likely require a greater allocation of resources to the state’s
juvenile justice system than what is currently provided for. The economic constraints
limiting the effectiveness of these reform proposals is beyond the scope of this
Comment, but it is an area that should garner more research, attention, and action.
For now, it is important to continue to make progress toward a more flexible,
responsive, and rehabilitative system, and implementing some or all of the proposals
offered in this Comment can do just that.
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